Mobile 2013: Defining decisions for Apple, Google, Microsoft, Nokia, RIM, Samsung

The last six years of mobile innovation, missteps, and regrouping will come to a head next year. We’ll see if Apple has plateaued or, worse, petered out. We’ll see if Google can rationalize the Android ecosystem and cement its market dominance through cohesion, and if Samsung can sustain its effort to be more than a mere device maker. We’ll see if Research in Motion’s two years of promises will become reality with the BlackBerry 10. We’ll see how — or if — Microsoft recovers from the confusing Windows 8, anemic Windows RT, and inadequate Windows Phone 8, and whether Nokia can hang on long enough now that its Windows Phone bet seems to have failed.

Since 2008, when Apple introduced the App Store and made the iPhone really compelling, much of the mobile story has been very familiar: Apple blazed the mobile trail while competitors either made inadequate copies (Google, Microsoft) or ignored the phenomenon (RIM, Nokia), both to their peril. But in 2012, both Google and Samsung woke up. Android 4.0 “Ice Cream Sandwich” started to do more than just copy iOS, then Android 4.1/4.2 “Jelly Bean” began to differentiate the Google platform from Apple’s in meaningful ways. Samsung took a parallel journey, mostly on the hardware front — for example, bringing back pen computing and pioneering new form factors — that resonated with the market.

[ 8 easy fixes Apple should make to iOS 6. | Discover RIM’s plans for BlackBerry 10, and learn how it will transition its BES management tool for the new BlackBerry OS. | Read InfoWorld’s review of Windows Phone 8. | Get expert advice about planning and implementing your BYOD strategy with InfoWorld’s “Mobile and BYOD Deep Dive” PDF special report. ]

Also in 2012, Apple stalled, with an excellent iPhone 5 that pushed no envelopes, a modest iOS 6 upgrade that sported the PR disaster of Apple Maps, a bungled conversion to the Lightning connector, and an unnecessary upgrade of the iPad. Only the iPad Mini was a meaningful release, a return to Apple’s tradition of taking an existing idea executed poorly and doing it right (this time, the 7-inch-class tablet).

As a result, 2013 will be a pivotal year for all the major mobile providers, with make-or-break decisions to be made by all. What follows are the key challenges I believe each faces and what they should do about them.

Apple: Get serious about iOS/OS X integration; port iTunes, AirPrint, and AirPlay In fall 2012, Apple updated most of its iOS and OS X hardware, and what it didn’t update then it had updated earlier in the year — with the exception of the Mac Pro tower used by a very specialized audience. Apple can now — and should — focus on its software.

iOS 6 and OS X Mountain Lion were decent updates, but evolutionary in nature. Apple needs to push them both to a new level. That means further intertwining the two. iOS is essentially a subset of OS X, with extensions for touch and telephony, and Apple has done a decent job cross-pollinating the two. iCloud is a great example, as are accessibility support (from OS X) and gestures (from iOS).

But as tablets essentially become the new laptop, Apple should blur the boundaries even more. Android is already doing so, with the notions of parental controls and multiple user accounts finding their way into Android 4.2 “Jelly Bean” and multiple windows in Samsung’s newest devices. iOS apps should run on OS X, for example. Also, iOS should support multiple users and be able to easily become windows to Macs (without requiring third-party apps, as is the case today).

Microsoft’s Windows 8 is a great example of how not to create an OS continuum across device types. Android “Jelly Bean” has some lessons to offer, but as long as Android stops at tablets, it can’t offer the full computing experience Apple can.

Apple also needs to open up its key content technologies, porting iTunes to Android, Windows 8, and perhaps BlackBerry if that platform survives 2013. Just as porting iTunes to Windows made iTunes the dominant music platform, porting it to mobile competitors will ensure that dominance. Apple should also make its AirPlay and AirPrint protocols available to other platforms (both are available in limited ways in Windows now). That may not drive iPhone and iPad sales, but it will drive Apple TV sales and boost the licensing revenue from the protocols to printer makers, TV makers, stereo makers, and the like — all of whom have held back from full commitment due to their Apple-client-only nature.

After all, DLNA and the other non-Apple media-streaming technologies have foundered or been deployed haphazardly, so the market remains there for Apple to take. But the Miracast standard, backed by the industry group that brought us interoperable Wi-Fi, could finally provide a common standard that isolates AirPlay. The ubiquity of Apple media and protocols across all modern devices made possible by making AirPlay available on competing platforms will mean more to Apple than potentially diminished device and Mac sales. If its iTunes for Windows experience doesn’t convince Apple, perhaps looking at Google’s cross-platform success with search and maps will make the case.

Google: Unify Android, bring it to the desktop, and get serious about supporting protocols When it comes to smartphones, Android dominates the market, outselling iPhones two to one. Android tablets don’t fare nearly as well, and the best-selling Android tablet seems to be the Kindle Fire, which uses a forked version of Android. (I say “seems” because Amazon.com doesn’t report sales figures, so no one really knows how many are sold. That’s a common practice in the Android community, making all market share claims suspect.)

The truth is that Android 2.3 “Gingerbread” is the most prominent version, accounting for half of the units in use. However, it’s not the Android that can compete with iOS. The Androids that can — “Ice Cream Sandwich,” which is at about 24 percent, and “Jelly Bean,” which is at less than 2 percent — trail iOS in adoption. Despite the braggadocio of Google chairman Eric Schmidt, that’s not a sign of success but of a complacent market happy to use old technology — the opposite of iOS.

The cellphone market has long been a mishmash of operating systems and custom versions, and the Android device makers have followed the same pattern with Android, thanks to the fact it can be customized as desired. That may get you market share, but not a platform. Also, market share is misleading: There were about 1 billion Java-powered cellphones in use a few years ago, but so what? No one but the carriers develops for them or seeks them out.

As good as “Jelly Bean” is, its advantages don’t matter if only a sliver of users have it and only a slightly larger sliver can hope to. Apple typically ensures that a new iOS version can run on devices released in the previous two — often three — years. It makes the upgrades available to all, typically getting more than half of users to upgrade in the first weeks of release. Google needs to do the same.

The problem is that it doesn’t believe in the notion of a common Android. Google develops Android internally, without community involvement (belying the myth that it is open source) and saves the newest innovations for itself, releasing them to device makers only after it’s enjoyed an exclusive period of use. That’s why a year after the release of “Ice Cream Sandwich,” most users still don’t have it — and can’t get it.

Google competes with Android device makers and plays favorites. On one hand it boasts about the advantages of an open ecosystem, but manipulates it to favor itself. The result is that the Android market is a mess of versions and inconsistent capabilities. Most users are using old, limited Android — they might as well be using a Windows Phone or BlackBerry for the limited capabilities they have.

Google needs to figure out how to have a common platform that’s easily updated while letting device makers retain the innovations and modifications they make — it’s no simple challenge but needs to occur for Google to keep Android fragmentation from harming its future or resort to a monolithic approach like Microsoft’s Windows Phone 8 strategy that discourages device makers because all their products end up being essentially the same.

Google’s Chrome OS confuses matters, providing a Google desktop experience wholly distinct from — and incompatible with — Android. I don’t think a cloud-based OS is realistic for most people today, but whether or not it is, Google’s desktop strategy should include Android for the traditional laptop and desktop forms of PC.

Google needs to resolve its Android strategy and either follow the Apple and Microsoft approach of high control or truly be an open but heterogeneous platform that doesn’t intend to be seen as “a” platform. Today, it’s not, though it at first appears to be, and users will notice as the interoperability issues and inconsistencies become more apparent.

Google also needs to put in printing, sharing, and streaming protocols à la AirPrint and AirPlay so that all Android devices can work with printers, media devices, and each other. The adoption of Miracast video streaming in the Nexus 4 and Nexus 10 seems to be Google’s answer to that issue, though Miracast-compatible TVs and media devices aren’t yet available. Should Apple port AirPlay, AirPrint, and iTunes, it’s game over for Google’s aspirations to replicate Apple’s entertainment business. True, Apple has no sharing protocol such as for business cards and screen status, but those in the Android world are device-specific and not usable in the world at large. Apple or Microsoft could fix that omission quickly, to Google’s detriment.

Finally, Google needs to reconsider its strong aversion to making the Android platform work in business environments. In 2012, it disbanded the 3LM group it bought as part of Motorola Mobility that could have provided iOS-like management and security capabilities to the Android platform; renamed the Android Market to Google Play; and set the “Jelly Bean” OS to force the media and entertainment onto users at each startup or return to the home screen. The first decision tells businesses they can’t depend on Android, and the other decisions tells individuals that Android is merely a device for play. If that’s really Google’s strategy, it will limit its role in the market unnecessarily — and unwisely — becoming essentially a type of Kindle.

Samsung: Stop sending mixed messages Of all the Android device makers, Samsung is the only one clearly trying to create a value-added platform. Like Google, its history had tended to be to copy others rather than innovate itself, but in the last couple years, Samsung has shown a new spirit of innovation. That’s good.

What Samsung has not been so good at is creating a cohesive platform across its devices. It’s cloned some Apple products — it has versions of the iPod Touch and iPod Nano, for example. It’s developed new form factors such as the Galaxy Note “phablet” and brought in pen computing to several models. It has smartphones and tablets in multiple sizes. It even has an Android-powered digital camera.

Samsung has it all, except for a consistent operating system. It’s clear that each Samsung device has a separate team for the UI and Android capabilities, and that shows up as an inconsistent user experience — precisely the wrong message to send if you want to be seen as a constellation of devices for every need. Samsung wants an Apple-like ecosystem, though more expansive. The good news is that it’s done some rationalization via its “Jelly Bean” upgrades, but not enough.

Likewise, Samsung has been sending mixed messages about its operating system commitments. It’s been focused mainly on Android, bit also has dabbled in the Windows Phone space. A couple years ago, it did well in some markets with its own Bada OS, aimed at lower-cost countries, but now has rolled that into the open source Tizen project, the latest version of the failed Linux-based operating systems (Maemo and MeeGo) that helped drag Nokia into irrelevance.

It makes sense to have different platforms for different markets, though given Android’s free license and freedom to modify, it would seem to make more sense to work on a subset of Android for low-cost markets. Perhaps Samsung isn’t confident in Android’s long-term viability (or, more accurately, Google’s good graces).

Research in Motion: Deliver or die RIM spent years regarding the iPhone as a toy, then hoping its IT customers would keep the iPhone out of business. That’s why RIM’s share of new sales has declined to about 6 percent, while the iPhone is now the preferred business smartphone even when purchased by IT. RIM’s board belatedly got a clue and fired RIM’s old guard execs, and for the past two years the company has been on a never-ending road show promising that BlackBerry 10 will reinvent RIM and the BlackBerry. For RIM’s sake, let’s hope the development has been as aggressive as the marketing.

RIM has ony one task in 2013: prove it has a viable, desirable smartphone. It can do so in only one way: by delivering a viable, desirable smartphone. RIM has made many unfulfilled promises before, so it’s not an easy bet. But we’ll know by spring 2013 whether the BlackBerry 10 is as good as RIM swears it is.

If the BlackBerry 10 is good, RIM will still have its work cut out for it to get people to buy it, though a reservoir of BlackBerry diehards and business users disappointed with Windows Phone 8, untrusting of Android, and uninterested in iOS could help. If BlackBerry 10 is bad, RIM will need to sell whatever assets have value and close shop.

Microsoft: Go back to the drawing board There’s a lot wrong with Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Phone 8. At root is a silly strategy that for Windows 8 and RT forces a touch experience on nontouch devices and a nontouch experience on touch devices. Likewise, in Windows “classic” mode you get the full windowing environment that Windows got its name from, but not in the new Windows “Metro” mode, where your PC is suddenly made limited. Thus, no matter what operating mode you’re in, a good portion of Windows 8 or RT just won’t work right. The fact that you are switching between two very different modes just compounds the problem and cognitive dissonance.

There are ways that Microsoft could evolve Windows 8 to work better, as I’ve proposed previously. But when your fundamental problem starts at the core, it’s usually best to start over. This time, it must do so with the same team for all versions, so there’s a single architecture in place — which is contrary to Microsoft’s culture of warring fiefdoms. But a divided Microsoft will fall.

Windows Phone 8’s problem is simpler: It’s a lightweight OS with lightweight apps that seem more thrown together than designed, but it pretends to be a smartphone OS like iOS or Android. Microsoft would be best served to remarket Windows Phone 8 as the simple smartphone for the nongeek majority — but that’ll be a hard sell if it can’t get carriers to cut user some slack on data access charges by providing lower data tiers for such “basic” smartphones.

Unfortunately, I suspect Microsoft will continue to pretend that Windows Phone 8 is a competitor to iOS and Android, fooling no one. And keeping its market share in the low single digits where all Windows Phone versions have been stuck. Buyers can tell the difference.

Nokia: Go low-cost Microsoft’s problems could be fatal for Nokia, which junked its Symbian OS and its multiple failed would-be successors (Maemo and MeeGo) a couple years ago in favor of Windows Phone. But Windows Phone has not helped Nokia, and its market share is at historic lows, underperforming even RIM’s single-digit range. Its Nokia Lumia 920 flagship is selling poorly, with stock running low only because stores get a mere handful of units to begin with.

And Nokia has few options to stand out in the Windows Phone world, thanks to Microsoft’s rigid specifications — Nokia can’t pull a Samsung. Its custom apps, such as Nokia Drive, aren’t nearly enough to excite would-be users to turn away from iOS or Android. It’s also finding unusually strong competition on the hardware side from HTC’s Windows 8X, which is sleeker than Nokia’s Lumia 920.

I just don’t see how Nokia can make a go of it in the premium smartphone market with Windows Phone. Apple and Samsung rightfully rule there. HTC has a better shot in the midrange space, given its prowess in building nice-looking smartphones for Android and Windows Phone and its brand recognition in the key North American market where Nokia has been largely absent for years. HTC can play the good-enough game better than Nokia can, and given how HTC has struggled to make profits in the Android market, it has a strong incentive to aggressively compete with Nokia in the Windows Phone market.

Nokia has long been the dominant cellphone maker worldwide, thanks not to high-end phones but low-end units. Its Symbian smartphones were not its mainstay, and they were never that smart anyhow. Series 40 was Nokia’s mainstay OS, and Nokia continues to push that cellphone OS in the form of the Asha series for emerging markets where phones need to cost $40 to $90 before subsidies, not $400 to $900 as most smartphones do.

Of course, that low-cost phone market is where the Chinese rising stars such as ZTE and Huawei are focused, and it’s not clear Nokia can compete with the state-subsidized, low-labor-cost Chinese juggernauts any more than it can compete with the superior Apple and Android offerings. But I’m not sure Nokia has a choice any more. I am sure that Windows Phone won’t save it.

Now it really gets interesting Each mobile provider has several big decisions to make in 2013 — decisions that in each case will make, break, or reshape them. The coming year will truly be pivotal. It will be fascinating to see what happens.

This article, “Mobile 2013: Defining decisions for Apple, Google, Microsoft, Nokia, RIM, Samsung,” was originally published at InfoWorld.com. Read more of Galen Gruman’s Mobile Edge blog and follow the latest developments in mobile technology at InfoWorld.com. Follow Galen’s mobile musings on Twitter at MobileGalen. For the latest business technology news, follow InfoWorld.com on Twitter.